Geo-political Flux in the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb: India's Stakes and Imperatives

The renewed threat to the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, following Iran's reported instruction to the Houthis to close it in response to potential U.S. strikes, arrives close on the heels of the Strait of Hormuz crisis. For India, whose one-third of total trade transits this chokepoint between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, this is not a distant geopolitical flashpoint. It is a direct economic and strategic vulnerability.

Lessons from 2024

The 2023–24 Houthi attacks disrupted Red Sea shipping. 2,000 vessels rerouted via the Cape of Good Hope. India-bound cargo faced delays. Egypt's Suez revenues fell sharply. Israel's Eilat port went bankrupt.
New Delhi relied on bilateral leverage with Tehran to halt the attacks. This was a reactive approach, not a durable one.
Today's conditions are harder. The UN Security Council remains deeply divided. Collective enforcement is unlikely.
China continues unilateral quid pro quos with the Houthis. This further weakens any rules-based response.

Building a Proactive Maritime Architecture: The Way Ahead

India must shift from reaction to pre-emptive deterrence.
A trilateral naval taskforce with France and Japan offers one path. Both nations maintain bases in Djibouti. Both have conducted joint drills with the Indian Navy. This taskforce need not be a strategic alliance. It can remain theatre-specific.
The Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) could anchor maritime domain awareness. France and Japan could provide logistical support.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia must also be engaged. Their economies are now directly at stake. They are unlikely to stay neutral this time.

Anchored in SAGAR and a rules-based maritime order, such a Trade Protection Task Force would signal India's capacity to safeguard both commercial shipping and its seafarers, ensuring Bab el-Mandeb does not again become a "Gate of Tears" for Indian interests.